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Book Reviews 
rience of the everyday in its height and depth, in its tribulations and its hopes" 
(p. 104). 
The drawbacks of this collection, arising primarily from Metz's choice of the 
essay as his primary vehicle, mirror those of Metz's corpus in general since his 
turn to political theology in the early 1960s. First, central concepts or themes are 
frequently alluded to rather than explicated. In the current work, "postmodern" 
and "hellenization of Christianity" might stand as examples. Regarding the latter, 
how far does this extend? Can the classic doctrines of the Church be separated 
and, hence, retrieved independently of their implication in an ontotheology? Is 
the rejection of "suffering" as an element of the divine life a remnant of some 
latent ontotheology on Metz's part? Given the constraints of the essay genre, it is 
hard to tell. A second weakness becomes visible when one compares Metz's work 
with that of Rahner. While Rahner risked-as Metz himself acknowledges--"talk- 
ing about God" for the Church, Metz appears either reluctant or unable to pro- 
ceed beyond "talk about talk about God." In particular, the claim that talk about 
God is circumscribed by theodicy raises significant issues regarding what Chris- 
tianity can say about God, Christ, and the Spirit. While I think Metz is correct to 
reject the strategy represented by Moltmann, the essay form occludes any con- 
structive parallel to that work. The danger here is the impression that a practical 
fundamental theology needs, but cannot support, a constructive exposition of the 
Christian faith. If that were to be the case, it might ironically represent the mark 
of the postmodern that separates these theological generations. Finally, for an 
author who has all too often been ill served by his translators, J. Matthew Ashley 
is to be commended both for his fine introduction to the text and especially for 
his felicitous translations. 
J. A. COLOMBO, University of San Diego. 
INGRAM, PAUL. Wrestling with the Ox: A Theology of Religious Experience. New York: 
Continuum, 1997. ix+246 pp. $22.50 (paper). 
For many years, Paul Ingram has offered distinguished leadership to the Society 
for Buddhist-Christian Studies. In addition, he is the editor and author of several 
widely admired scholarly works. He now has written a book that appeals to a 
"pluralist" model of religious diversity as the proper basis for interreligious dia- 
logue. Based in part on my own theological commitments and my participation 
in interreligious dialogues with Buddhists, I disagree with Ingram on the basic 
presuppositions of his book. The criticism of Ingram's work that follows should 
not lose sight of this point. I will try to be as clear as possible about these disagree- 
ments on fundamentals. 
Ingram bases his book on what he calls a "primordial model" of religious plu- 
ralism. The roots of this model go back to Aldous Huxley and Ramakrishna. All 
religions, according to Ingram, are culturally and historically contingent interpre- 
tations of a transcendent absolute that is variously called the Dao, God, Brahman, 
Allah, Wakan, or Emptiness. Thus all religions offer differing paths that lead to 
the same ultimate reality, what Ingram calls "the Sacred," or more poetically, "the 
relatively inaccessible Ox" (a reference to the "Ox-Herding Pictures" of Zen). In- 
gram's primordial model has much in common with what George Lindbeck calls 
the experiential-expressivist model of religion. Not surprisingly, Ingram offers 
generally approving summaries of the positions of John Hick, Paul Knitter, 
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W. C. Smith, and Huston Smith. With this theoretical foundation, Ingram offers 
discussions of Whitehead (chap. 5), the environment (chap. 6), women's liberation 
(chap. 7), political and economic liberation (chap. 8), salvation (chap. 9), and the 
unity of "postmodern" religious experience (chap. 10). 
The primordial model accounting for the diversity of religions offers the most 
honest and open basis for entering into interreligious dialogue in Ingram's view. 
More significantly, it is the basis for affirming the deep similarities that unify 
religions as paths to the Sacred. Given this affirmation of similarity, Ingram's de- 
scription of his model of religious diversity as "postmodern" is surprising. Con- 
trary to Ingram, I see the primordial model of religious diversity as an example 
of modernity's preoccupation with grand narratives that attempt to control differ- 
ences. If postmodernity celebrates difference, Ingram celebrates the fundamental 
similarity that unites religious traditions. When religions are seen from the point 
of view of the Sacred, Ingram assures us, "distinctions blur" (p. 178). The notion 
of a universal but ineffable absolute that unites all religions despite their apparent 
differences should be seen as yet another assertion of what the deconstructionists 
call "full presence." Ingram, a historian of religions, speaks with the voice of the 
European Enlightenment. This is modernism, not postmodernism. 
"Postmodern" is a vague notion at best. Even still, I do not believe my disagree- 
ment with Ingram over the postmodern status of his model of religion is a mere 
quibble. It is related to my dissatisfaction with the primordial model as a suitable 
basis for interreligious dialogue. Here is another basic point of disagreement. 
Entering into dialogues with non-Christians is a particularly promising way of 
doing Christian theology today. In my own case, friendships with Buddhists have 
enabled and required me to revise my understanding of Christianity. The primor- 
dial model, with its appeal to a metareligious absolute that is only dimly grasped 
by all the religions themselves, effectively excuses a Christian from the necessity 
of having to change her mind about anything of real importance. This is certainly 
not Ingram's intent, but it is the effect of his argument. The problem is often em- 
bedded within language that many will see as admirably tolerant. For example, 
Ingram thinks that "the sacred does not play favorites; all paths lead to the same 
summit ... and it does not ultimately matter which path one takes as long as it is 
followed truly and authentically." If "authenticity" (sincerity?) is sufficient to jus- 
tify the way one lives one's life, beliefs would seem to have very little to do with 
matters of religious truth. We are free to believe whatever we want. No Buddhist 
could possibly make a claim that could ever require a Christian to revise her 
beliefs. In any event, the differences that distinguish Buddhists from Christians 
are merely apparent anyway. Far from offering a suitable basis for entering into 
interreligious dialogue as Ingram argues, the primordial model is a major ob- 
stacle to it. 
Is there a universal and ineffable religious "experience" that lies behind all the 
religious traditions? The most sensible response to this question is to stop asking 
it. Theologians and historians of religions should expunge the word "experience" 
from their lexicon. At best, this word is a useless vagary. At worst, the term leads 
us into the thickets of privatized discourse about religion. The question cannot 
be resolved and is not useful. The problem, however, is yet more serious. If one 
approaches religious diversity with the presupposition that there is no common 
ground in a transreligious experience, religions tend to be seen in terms of in- 
commensurate difference. On the other hand, if one assumes along with Ingram 
that religions are linked by an ineffable and universal experience of the Sacred, 
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the significant differences that distinguish religions from one another are ren- 
dered theologically uninteresting. In this case, the encounter between religious 
believers is rendered uninteresting as well. In sitting down with a Buddhist, a 
Christian can expect to find only more of the same. Theologians interested in 
interreligious dialogue or in doing theology comparatively should turn away from 
the entire question of religious experience or metanarratives about religion in 
general in favor of concrete experiments in comparison. On this score, the work 
of Francis X. Clooney and Lee Yearly is exemplary. 
JAMES L. FREDERICKS, Loyola Marymount University. 
BYRNE, JAMES M. Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant. Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1997. xiii+253 pp. $22.00 (paper). 
James Byrne has done students of modern Western religious thought a valuable 
service by writing this clear, reliable, comprehensive, yet relatively brief, account 
of the fortunes of (Christian) religious ideas during the Age of Reason. Designed 
primarily as a textbook, Religion and the Enlightenment is suitable for college, semi- 
nary, and perhaps even introductory graduate courses. I found it especially useful 
as the background text for a recent undergraduate survey of the period in which 
I assigned primary readings from Rene Descartes, Blaise Pascal, G. W. Leibniz, 
Voltaire, Jacob Spener, J.-J. Rousseau, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. In its 
role as an interpretive companion and historical supplement to these challenging 
thinkers, Byrne's book supplies much of the material one would otherwise be 
tempted to pack into lectures. The pedagogical benefit is more class time for 
discussion and close readings of the primary texts. My students gave the book 
high marks, as do I. 
The first two chapters are largely preparatory. After dealing with the problem 
of periodization, chapter 1 introduces some characteristic themes of the age (rea- 
son, skepticism, progress, modern science) that find repeated, but extremely var- 
ied, illustration throughout the rest of the book. This introductory treatment is 
entirely conventional until the end of the chapter where Byrne addresses two 
additional topics that command great interest today: the impact of the discovery 
of other cultures and civilizations on European self-understanding and the failure 
of the enlightened elite to live up to their own ideals of universal rationality, basic 
human rights, and toleration of difference in the cases of women and Jews. Chap- 
ter 2, "Enlightenment, Power, and Context," is a down payment on Byrne's sound 
aim throughout the book to "see ideas not as free-floating products of pure re- 
flection but as embedded in a context, reflecting practical concerns and driven 
by the interests of a mixture of people with a wide variety of motives" (p. x). To- 
ward this end, Byrne traces social and political developments, especially church- 
state relations, in Britain, France, Austria, and the United States. Given the book's 
focus on Europe and the importance of Leibniz, Pietism, and especially Kant in 
the narrative, he might have profitably substituted Prussia for the United States 
in this chapter. In the remainder of the book, full chapters are devoted to the 
thought of Descartes, Pascal, Rousseau, and Kant. Deism(s), the emergence of 
atheism, and the development of experimental science and materialism each re- 
ceive a chapter of their own. Denis Diderot and the Encyclopedists receive more 
attention than usual in a book aimed primarily at students of theology, as does 
Pierre Bayle. These central chapters build nicely on, and frequently refer to, each 
313 
